The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?

[RainDog]

http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf

This was written in 2012, before CO and WA legalized marijuana at the state level. The article was written in response to questions by lawyers about the current changes in the way the world views marijuana and public opposition to the "war on drugs."

Nowhere is this battle more pronounced than in the so-called ―marijuana wars, which are slowly
growing into an old-fashioned standoff between the states and the federal government. As of August 2012, seventeen states (and the District of Columbia) have passed laws legalizing medical use of marijuana, several states have introduced initiatives to outright legalize the use of recreational marijuana, and now there are two proposed federal bills designed to lift the ban on marijuana. The Gallup polls show that at least 70% of Americans support legalizing marijuana for medical use and now over 50% are in favor of its legalization for recreational use as well.

Lately, all eyes have been on the Obama Administration, which, with the reversal on its marijuana policy, has baffled the drug reform community and often, the public at large. One of President Obama’s campaign promises was to leave the issue of medical marijuana to state governments, stating, "I'm not going to be using Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on this issue." Indeed, his Administration first declared a policy of nonenforcement
against medical marijuana dispensaries operating in full compliance with state laws. Over the past year, however, the Administration has backtracked, famously announcing a―crackdown on not only dispensaries, but also landlords, banks, media outlets and all but the sickest of patients taking advantage of the medical marijuana laws.

(since the writing of this piece, the AG has stated CO and WA laws may go forward and the AG has agreed to a framework that allows marijuana businesses to utilize banks without those banks being viewed as money launderers (though quite a few of them have had no problem laundering international drug cartel money in the past...)

...In addition to the 1961 Single Convention, two other international treaties have a direct bearing on international control of narcotics and psychotropic substances. These are the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which, enacted after an upsurge of drug use in the 1960s, added certain synthetic, prescription, and hallucinogenic drugs (including LSD) to the list of controlled substances. The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was enacted in response to an increase in trafficking. The 1988 Convention required member countries, for the first time, to criminalize possession for personal consumption. Notably, the 1988 Convention did not specify how users were to be punished; only that ―possession, purchase or cultivation for personal consumption be made a criminal offense. The 1988 Convention specifically states that its implementation should be accompanied by prudence and is subject to each party’s ―constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system.

These three international treaties constitute the international law concerning the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The treaties are not ―self-executing, meaning that each country must enact laws implementing the treaties in their own jurisdictions. The Conventions are legally binding pursuant to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—a country ―may not circumscribe its obligations under the treaties by enacting a conflicting domestic law. On the other hand, there is no international police force standing at the ready to force countries to fulfill their obligations. The INCB has no real power to enforce them: its powers are limited to ―quiet diplomacy, or ―blaming and shaming. In extreme cases, the INCB can recommend an embargo on all prescription medicines coming into or going out of a country. In our interview with former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and current INCB member Melvyn Levitsky, he noted that this is ―not a strong provision, since, for humanitarian reasons, it is highly unlikely such a measure would ever be taken against a country.

(Many nations have interpreted the 1988 Convention to make possession illegal as "possession with intent to traffick." This is how The Netherlands can have coffee shops that sell cannabis, while possession laws themselves remain on the books - The Netherlands simply chooses not to enforce the law in relation to cannabis or psilocybin use while the production or sale, prior to the sale to an individual, does result in arrests for possession. Portugal, as well, decriminalized all drugs because the 1988 Convention does not indicate any punishment for possession. Therefore, Portugal made possession a civil infraction and punishment is limited to a fine. They also recommend drug treatment programs, but have not made these mandatory as a result of possession. )

The article mentions the Bolivian coca leaf exception as an example of the move in various nations to directly challenge the drug treaties that have existed since conservatives in the U.S. led the move to more restrictive international drug treaties. Prior to Uruguay's full legalization of cannabis, many Central and South American nations challenged the U.S. intransigence on marijuana drug policy at the Summit of the Americas.

Since Uruguay legalized, the United Nations has protested the change in drug treaty compliance as an international violation. Since there is no actual legal cost to any nation for violating these drug treaties, however, there is little incentive for nations to continue outmoded policy. The violation of such treaties is a matter of consequence when those nations can be targeted with a refusal of UN aid monies, as has been the threat in the past. However, since Uruguay is already negotiating international trade in marijuana, any sanctions, based upon projections for profit in regard to marijuana sales, may seem minor in comparison.

While this article makes the claim that President Obama may feel obliged to continue prohibition in order to honor international treaties, there is no force behind the action, i.e. there is NO INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE for refusing to enforce the treaties the U.S. helped to create.

The claim, in the article, that the World Health Organization must approve rescheduling is not based upon precedent. Congress has added items to the drug schedule without seeking approval from any outside body. The International Drug Policies themselves were largely crafted and forced upon every other nation by the United States.

Therefore, the logic is that the U.S. cannot change the scheduling of marijuana because marijuana was temporarily placed as a schedule I drug pending further investigation. Since that time, the DEA has refused to consider rescheduling, in spite of its own administrative judge noting marijuana is the safest medicinal substance known to humankind in its natural form, and in spite of the judgment of the Schafer Commission that marijuana possession should not be the subject of ANY legal sanction.

The law as it exists, in other words, is based upon political and ideological resistance, rather than any scientific or medical justification, and the law exists in spite of the evidence that indicates illegality is worse than the substance itself.

This circle jerk of "we can't do this because we can't do this" is ludicrous. We very well can do this, and we should.

When the U.S. cares as much about its treaty obligations in regard to torture as it does to cannabis, maybe then the argument would have some teeth. Until then... this is all just theater.

[djean111]

1. When the U.S. cares as much about its treaty obligations in regard to torture as it does to cannabis

maybe then the argument would have some teeth. Until then... this is all just theater. "
EXACTLY!!!!!